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Toward a More Equitable Approach to Causation
in Veterinary Malpractice Actions
Jayne De Young
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the law, animals are considered the personal property of their
guardians.' Accordingly, the vast majority of courts have valued animals
according to their "replacement" or "market" value, just as they would a
2stereo or a car. As recent studies indicate, however, humans are more
likely to view their companion animals as family members rather than as
property.3
In the United States, there is nearly one pet for every two
Americans. Further, approximately 124 million dogs and cats live
in American households. In one study, forty-five percent of dog
owners reported that they take their pets on vacation. Another
recent survey revealed that more than half of companion animal
owners would prefer a dog or a cat to a human if they were
stranded on a deserted island. Another poll revealed that fifty
percent of pet owners would be "very likely" to risk their lives to
save their pets, and another thirty-three percent indicated they
would be "somewhat likely" to put their own lives in danger.4
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In line with the ubiquitous nature of the human-animal connection, a small
number of courts have recognized that animals, as sentient beings, are a
unique form of property and have held that elements such as loss of
companionship and sentimental value may be included when calculating
damages.
5
Attempting to steer through this unsettled (and somewhat
schizophrenic) legal landscape, lawyers have employed a number of causes
of action in an attempt to recover damages for the injury or death of a
companion animal, including bailment, conversion, negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of companionship and
veterinary malpractice. 6 Courts have been skeptical of them all, but it
appears that more jurisdictions are beginning to recognize veterinary
malpractice as a valid cause of action.7
It is difficult to find malpractice statistics, but one source estimates that
more than 2,000 malpractice claims against veterinarians are filed in the
United States each year.8 Though veterinary malpractice claims appear to
be on the rise, 9 this figure is still quite small when compared to the
approximately 86,000 medical malpractice claims filed in 2000.10
Given that companion animals are often viewed as members of the
family, and that there seems to be little reluctance to file medical
malpractice claims on behalf of human family members who suffered
injury or death while under the care of a physician, one might wonder why
there are not more legal actions taken against veterinarians on behalf of
companion animals. Could it be that veterinarians are more conscientious
than medical doctors and thus make fewer mistakes? Janice Morgan,
Doctor of Veterinary Medicine and Trust Representative for the American
Veterinary Medical Association's Professional Liability Insurance Trust,
which provides malpractice insurance to many veterinarians, suggests this
is so when she says, "Our profession is so diligent in [its] care of animals,
[that] our rates have not changed for eight years."11  It is implausible,
however, to conclude that the stability of veterinary malpractice premiums
Recoverable for their Wrongful Death or Injury, 47 VILL. L. REv. 423 (2002) (footnotes
omitted).
5. See Brousseau v. Rosenthal, 110 Misc. 2d 1054, 1055-56 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980);
Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., 510 N.E.2d 1086, 1087 (I11. App. Ct. 1987).
6. Cheryl M. Bailey, Annotation, Veterinarian's Liability for Malpractice, 71
A.L.R.4th 811 (2004).
7. Id.
8. ORLAND SOAVE, ANIMALs, THE LAW AND VETERINARY MEDICINE 21 (2000).
9. Joseph H. King, Jr., The Standard of Care for Veterinarians in Medical
Malpractice Claims, 58 TENN L. REv. 1, 2 (1990).
10. Medicalmalpractice.com, National Medical Malpractice Statistic, at
http://www.medicalmalpractice.com/National-Medical-Malpractice-Facts.cfm (last visited
Mar. 31, 2005).
11. Erin Harty, Veterinary Malpractice, at http://www.vetcentric.com/magazine/
magazineArticle.cfm?ARTICLEID= 1339 (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
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is due to the veterinary profession's superior care of those placed in its
charge. If all things were equal, the percentage of claims as compared to
visits would likely be comparable between doctors ministering to humans
and those who care for animals. But, as this Note demonstrates, the legal
and economic barriers to veterinary malpractice cases put these lawsuits on
an entirely different footing.
Most likely, the chief reason that relatively few cases are brought on
behalf of animals injured while under the care of a veterinarian is the
limited potential for recovery of significant damages. Most courts still
employ a "replacement" value measure of damages and do not allow
recovery for pain and suffering for the animal or guardian. 12 As a result,
the amount a plaintiff could expect to recover is severely restricted. These
minimal awards are inadequate to pay for lawyers' fees or even
transactional costs in many cases. Thus, unless potential plaintiffs are in a
position to finance the case themselves and are not relying on the award to
recompense the outlay of fees and costs, these cases will only proceed if
lawyers are willing to work for minimal or no pay.
This Note focuses on an additional barrier to filing a claim against a
veterinarian - the difficulty of proving causation under veterinary
malpractice standards. The recordkeeping requirements in most veterinary
practices are far less exhaustive than in human health care settings, and as a
result, the ability of an animal's guardian to prove that a veterinarian's
particular act or omission actually caused the injury or death of the animal
under their care is extremely difficult. The factual differences between the
physician-patient and veterinarian-animal relationship (such as the inability
of animals to describe what happened to them while under the
veterinarian's care) also hinder the ability of a potential plaintiff to prove
causation.
Because of these difficulties, a different approach to proving causation
is appropriate. This Note advocates a burden-shifting approach to the
causation element of veterinary malpractice. The Note commences with an
12. This is a rapidly changing field, however, and there is significant commentary
suggesting a shift towards a damages evaluation based more on societal estimates of
animals' values than on traditional property principles. See, e.g., Bueckner v. Hamel, 886
S.W.2d 368, 377 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994). ("[Slimple property concepts cannot reflect the
complex reality of the relationships between humans and their pets. Because of the
characteristics of animals in general, and domestic pets in particular, I consider them to
belong to a unique category of 'property' that neither statutory law or case law has yet
recognized.") (Andell, J., concurring opinion); see also Elaine T. Byszewski, Valuing
Companion Animals in Wrongful Death Cases: A Survey of Current Court and Legislative
Action and a Suggestion for Valuing Pecuniary Loss of Companionship, 9 ANIMAL L. 215
(2003); Geordie Duckler, The Economic Value of Companion Animals: A Legal and
Anthropological Argument for Special Valuation, 8 ANIMAL L. 199 (2002); Sonia S.
Waisman & Barbara R. Newell, Recovery of "Non-Economic" Damages for Wrongful
Killing or Injury of Companion Animals: A Judicial and Legislative Trend, 7 ANIMAL L. 45
(2001).
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overview of some of the different methods by which animal guardians have
sought redress for the injury or death of an animal while under the care of a
veterinarian. This overview is followed by a detailed look at the elements
of veterinary malpractice. Next, the recordkeeping standards in veterinary
practices will be examined. Finally, this Note will explore several
situations in which the courts have employed a burden-shifting approach
and explain why that same approach should be employed in the veterinary
malpractice context.
II. TRADITIONAL AND COMMON LAW CLAIMS FOR
NEGLIGENCE OF VETERINARIANS
A. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION FOR MALPRACTICE
Veterinarians have an obligation to the state in which they practice.
This duty arises by virtue of the enforcement and licensing powers of state
agencies, and to a very limited degree through participation in professional
organizations. 13 Any animal guardian can file a complaint with her state's
veterinary licensing board. 14 Claimants sometimes proceed with a lawsuit
and grievance procedure, in the hope that a successful veterinary board
grievance may lead to a quicker resolution in the courts. Some states vest
the licensing board with the authority to pass regulations governing the
practice of veterinary medicine; a veterinarian's license can be revoked for
violating these regulations.' 5 Other states have statutes that provide for the
revocation of a license for specifically stated reasons such as
"incompetence."' 6 While filing a complaint with a state or professional
organization provides no compensation to the animal's guardian, the
procedure may act as a check on an individual veterinarian, and in many
instances, may be the only realistic option given the current animal law
jurisprudence. 17
B. CONVERSION
The tort of conversion is defined as "the wrongful possession or
disposition of another's property as if it were one's own; an act or series of
acts of willful interference, without lawful justification, with an item of
property in a manner inconsistent with another's right....18 A claim for
conversion may be brought when one has willfully deprived a person of
their property by withholding or significantly damaging it. In conversion,
13. David S. Favre, Veterinarian Malpractice, at http://www.animallaw.info/articles/
arusfavrevetmalpractice.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 144 (2d ed. 2001).
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the full value of the property at the time and place of the tort is the measure
of damages.' 9
The case of Fredeen v. Stride presents an unusual set of facts leading to
a successful claim for conversion against a veterinarian. 20  The plaintiff
paid a veterinarian to euthanize her dog. Before the veterinarian carried out
the plaintiffs request, two of his veterinary assistants asked whether they
could nurse the dog back to health and find a home for him. The
veterinarian agreed to allow them to take responsibility for the dog.2'
Some months later, the plaintiff spotted the dog on the street.22 She sued
the veterinarian for conversion. The plaintiff prevailed and was awarded
punitive damages, as well as damages for the mental distress she suffered
upon seeing the dog.23
Because conversion is an intentional tort, the plaintiff has to show the
veterinarian had a desire to convert the property. However, the intent
required is not necessarily conscious wrongdoing. It is, rather, the intent to
exercise control over the property that is inconsistent with the plaintiffs
rights.24 As an intentional tort, conversion offers plaintiffs the opportunity
to seek punitive damages, a considerable advantage where replacement
value is often all that the plaintiff can otherwise hope to collect.25
C. Loss OF COMPANIONSHIP
Loss of companionship is typically pled in wrongful death actions
where a spouse, child, or parent has been deprived of the companionship of
a family member. Courts have rejected loss of companionship of an animal
as an independent cause of action, primarily because companion animals
are considered property.26
In a case against two veterinarians employed by a veterinary hospital,
the plaintiffs sought to recover damages for the loss of companionship they
had experienced as a result of their dog's death.27 The plaintiffs had taken
their dog in for diagnostic treatment. During the course of the exam, the
veterinarians administered anesthesia and the dog died. 28 The plaintiffs
19. See id. See also Kane v. County of San Diego, 83 Cal.Rptr. 19 (1969) (county
held liable under conversion when one of its shelters immediately destroyed greyhound dogs
in violation of a California statute requiring a 72-hour wait period; county ordered to pay
plaintiffs fair market value of the dogs, plus interest, from the date of the dogs' destruction).
20. 525 P.2d 166 (Or. 1974).
21. Id. at 168.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 170.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 223 cmt. b (1965).
25. See, e.g., Levine v. Knowles, 197 So. 2d 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (holding
that owner was entitled to punitive damages if he could establish that despite instructions to
hold his dog's body, the veterinarian willfully cremated it to avoid an autopsy and possible
veterinary malpractice claim).
26. Byszewski, supra note 12, at 223-24.
27. Jankoski, 510 N.E.2d at 1084-85.
28. Id
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expressly disavowed any claim for the commercial or replacement value of
the dog, instead requesting that the law be extended to allow for the loss of
companionship as an independent cause of action.29 Ignoring the emotional
attachment between animal guardians and their companion animals, the
court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The court stated
simply that to allow loss of companionship as an independent cause of
action, when the companion at issue is a dog, is inconsistent with Illinois
law. 3
0
There have been occasions, however, where the court factored in the
loss of companionship in the calculation of a companion animal's value.3'
For example, the court in Brousseau v. Rosenthal included both the
companionship value and the protective value of the plaintiffs dog when it
calculated the damages award against the kennel where the plaintiffs dog
had died.3 2 Still, most courts have not followed the Brousseau approach,
instead maintaining that plaintiffs cannot recover for loss of companionship
because the companion at issue is classified as property under the law.
D. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Courts generally condition recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress on certain factors, including: (1) plaintiff also suffered
physical injury; (2) plaintiff was in the "zone of danger" when a third
person was injured; (3) plaintiff observed the accident or injury involving
the third person; (3) plaintiff manifested physical injury from the emotional
distress; or (4) plaintiff shared a familial relationship with the injured third
person.33 Negligent infliction of emotional distress may be brought in an
action that includes a claim for destruction of property, or it may be pled as
an independent cause of action. Still, many jurisdictions do not allow
recovery for emotional distress resulting from a loss of property, thereby
precluding recovery for the loss of a companion animal.34
Hawaii is a rare exception. In 1970, the Supreme Court of Hawaii, in
Rodrigues v. State of Hawaii, allowed plaintiffs to recover damages for
negligent infliction of emotional distress caused by the flooding of their
new home.35 In fashioning its approach, the court cited the two primary
arguments against recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress
29. Id. at 1087.
30. Id.
31. See Brousseau, 110 Misc. 2d at 1056; see also Gluckman v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
844 F. Supp. 151, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (explaining that in New York, loss of
companionship is not an independent cause of action, but a means for assessing the inherent
value of the lost pet when the market value cannot be determined).
32. Brousseau, 110 Misc. 2d at 1056.
33. Byszewski, supra note 12.
34. See Roman v. Carrol, 621 P.2d 307, 308 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Fackler v.
Genetzky, 595 N.W.2d 884, 892 (Neb. 1999); Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795,
798 (Wis. 2001).
35. 472 P.2d 509 (Haw. 1970).
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related to property destruction: (1) the probability that courts would be
flooded by fraudulent claims and (2) defendants' potentially unlimited
liability for mental distress.36  However, the court found these
considerations were outweighed by the plaintiffs' interest in freedom from
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and therefore allowed the
plaintiffs to recover for the distress they suffered upon the negligent
destruction of their property.
37
Relying on the Rodrigues case, the Campbell family brought an action
for negligent infliction of emotional distress against Hawaii's quarantine
station. 38 The station had left Princess, the family's dog, in an unventilated
van, resulting in Princess' death from heat prostration.39 The family was
notified of Princess' death by telephone. 40  No one in the family was
present at the time Princess died, nor were any of the plaintiffs placed in
any danger.4' In affirming the damages award, the court noted that since its
decision in Rodrigues ten years earlier, there had been no flood of cases
and that the "fears of unlimited liability had not proved true.
'A2
Nevertheless, to date, other states have shown great reluctance to allow
recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional distress due to destruction
of property, some still citing fears of opening the floodgates to litigation.43
E. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
To establish intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff
must prove the following: (1) that the defendant committed an extreme and
outrageous act with the intent to cause the plaintiff emotional distress or
with reckless disregard of the probability of causing the plaintiff emotional
distress; (2) that the plaintiff suffered severe distress; and (3) that the
defendant's conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the injury.44 In
cases involving intentional harm to an animal, courts have displayed more
willingness to allow recovery for emotional distress.45 Animal guardians
have recovered in a number of cases, but most did not involve veterinarians
as defendants.46 In the context of veterinary malpractice, it is difficult for a
plaintiff to establish that a veterinarian engaged in an extreme and
36. Id at 519.
37. Id. at 520.
38. Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066 (Haw. 1981).
39. Id. at 1067.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 1071.
43. Rabideau, 627 N.W.2d at 798-99; Pacher v. Invisible Fence of Dayton, 798
N.E.2d. 1121, 1125-26 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
44. Katsaris v. Cook, 225 Cal. Rptr. 531, 536-47 (1986).
45. Byszewski, supra note 12.
46. See, e.g., Brown v. Muhlenberg, 269 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2001); Richardson v.
Fairbanks North Star Bureau, 705 P.2d 454 (Alaska 1985); Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d
806 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).
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outrageous act. Even if plaintiffs can prove this element, courts may still
reject the claim if the veterinarian's misconduct was directed at the animal
and not the guardian.47
F. BAILMENT
Because of companion animals' status as property, bailment is a
possible and logical cause of action in cases of veterinary error.
A bailment is a legal relationship created by the delivery of personal
property by one party, the bailor, to another, the bailee, in trust for a
specific purpose, pursuant to an express or implied contract.48 The delivery
implies, as a matter of law, a contractual relationship and a form of strict
liability for the bailee. After the purpose of the bailment has been fulfilled,
the property is reclaimed by the person who delivered it. 49 A cause of
action for a breach of bailment occurs when the bailor can establish: (1)
that he delivered his property to the bailee; (2) that he demanded the return
of the bailed goods; and (3) the bailee failed to return the property in the
same condition as when it was delivered, or in the condition upon which
the parties agreed. °
When the bailee is hired to provide services, such as boarding an
animal at a kennel, the bailee has a legal duty to use ordinary diligence in
providing that care. If the bailee purports to have specialized skill or
knowledge in the service she is hired to provide, she is required to exercise
that skill or knowledge. If the bailee fails to do so, she will be held liable at
that higher standard.51 For example, if a guardian delivered her puppy for a
hysterectomy, the bailment contract would be breached if the puppy did not
have the hysterectomy or did have the surgery, but was otherwise injured.
The bailor must establish three elements - delivery, demand for
return, and either a failure to return or a return of "damaged goods. 52 A
presumption of negligence is then established, and the burden of proof
shifts to the defendant to prove that she was not negligent in her care of the
property. This cause of action is useful in states that allow it to be used
against veterinarians, since defendants are required to prove the negative -
that they were not negligent. This is always a difficult proposition.
The case of David v. Lose represents a traditional application of
47. See Gluckman, 844 F. Supp. at 158 (denying guardian recovery where a dog
suffered brain damage after being left in 140-degree heat in an unventilated cargo hold,
because intentional or reckless conduct must be directed towards the human plaintiff);
Miller v. Peraino, 626 A.2d 637 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (refusing to allow recovery for
intentional infliction of emotional distress where a veterinarian beat a dog to death, because
the conduct was directed at the animal and not the guardian).
48. E. B. McGurk, Inc. v. Fuller, 14 Conn. Supp. 7, 9 (1946).
49. Price v. Brown, 680 A.2d 1149, 1151-52 (Pa. 1996).
50. Id.
51. Fuller, 14 Conn. Supp. at 10.
52. Id. at 9.
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bailment principles. There, the plaintiff delivered his mare to the
defendant's stable for breeding purposes and was charged a stud fee,
thereby creating a bailment.53 While in the defendant's stable, the mare
suffered a broken leg.54 The plaintiff sued the stable owner for breach of
the bailment contract due to the bailee's failure to redeliver the mare in an
undamaged condition.55 Because the bailee could not show how the
damage occurred, he had to affirmatively prove that he had taken
reasonable precautions to prevent damage from occurring. 56 Having failed
to meet that burden, the bailee was found liable for breach of bailment.
57
The seminal case rejecting the application of bailment in a veterinary
context is Price v. Brown.58 There the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that a complaint alleging breach of a bailment agreement was insufficient
to state a cause of action against a veterinarian for the death of an animal
entrusted to her care for professional treatment.5 9 In reaching its decision,
the court likened the veterinary profession to the legal and medical
professions, in that all three involve special education, knowledge, and
skills. 60 The court also noted the significant differences between veterinary
surgical procedures and mere kennel services, presumably finding the latter
better suited to a bailment agreement. 61 Refusing to apply the breach of
bailment cause of action, the court instead extended professional
negligence concepts to veterinary medicine.62
In so holding, the court ignored the significant distinctions between the
patient-physician relationship and the client-veterinarian contract,
discussed in further detail infra. The dissent, acknowledging these
differences, argued that animals' status as property under the law made
them the proper subject of bailment cases.63 The dissent went on to say
that because the subject matter of treatment in veterinary malpractice
claims and medical malpractice claims were so different and because the
victim of veterinary malpractice is incapable of bringing his own case
against the veterinarian, the medical malpractice cause of action should not
be expanded to include the veterinary profession.64
For the plaintiff, a claim based on bailment is a more attractive option
than veterinary malpractice because it does not require expert witnesses
and puts the burden of proof on the defendant to explain what happened to
53. 218 N.E.2d 442, 444 (Ohio 1966).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 445.
57. Id.
58. Price, 680 A.2d at 1151.
59. Id. at 1153.
60. Id. at 1152.
61. Id. at 1153.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1155.
64. Price, 680 A.2d at 1155.
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65
the animal. Due to the special difficulty in proving the elements of
malpractice in the veterinary context, the malpractice cause of action is
much more difficult to bring and is a major advantage for veterinarians,
especially when compared to bailment.
III. VETERINARY MALPRACTICE
At common law, legal claims based on malpractice did not apply to
veterinarians.66 Through judicial rule and the adoption of legislation over
the last fifty years or more, there has been an expansion of the concept of
malpractice to include veterinarians.67 Some courts have held that the law
of medical malpractice actions also applies to veterinary malpractice
actions. 68 This association between medical and veterinary malpractice is
significant because of the proliferation of medical malpractice litigation.
69
The latest theories of recovery and trends in medical malpractice
jurisprudence, including the relevant standard of care and techniques for
presenting evidence, are being applied to veterinary malpractice actions as
well.7°
Many courts in the United States have taken this approach of applying
the traditional medical malpractice elements to cases involving veterinary
malpractice. However, there is no universal agreement that the elements of
medical malpractice should apply in cases alleging veterinary malpractice.
A court in Texas expressly disagreed with the notion, saying the court was
"not convinced that the standard applicable to medical malpractice on
human beings should be applied to veterinary malpractice cases in light of
Texas law relegating animals to personal property status.'
The liability of veterinarians, like that of physicians, has most often
been determined under a fault-based system of liability. 72 There must be
proof that the veterinarian engaged in tortious conduct. As the Supreme
Court of Alabama stated, "the law does not require a veterinarian to be
infallible in his treatment of an animal. 73 Where courts have adopted a
veterinary malpractice cause of action, the requirements have been similar
to medical malpractice actions:
To state a cause of action based upon the negligent acts or
omissions of a veterinarian in the performance of professional
duties or services, the plaintiff must plead (1) the employment of
65. Favre, supra note 13.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Bailey, supra note 6.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Pruitt v. Box, 984 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex. App. 1998).
72. King, supra note 9, at 5.
73. Turner v. Benhart, 527 So. 2d 717, 718 (Ala. 1988).
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the veterinarian or other basis for the duty; (2) the veterinarian's
failure to exercise the appropriate standard of care; and (3) that the
veterinarian's departure from that standard was the proximate
cause of the animal's injury or death.74
A. DUTY
While veterinarians are under no legal duty to treat an ill or injured
animal, it is generally held that the duty of the veterinarian arises when she
accepts a case and takes an animal under her care.75 This duty requires the
veterinarian to "use such reasonable skill, diligence and attention as may be
expected of careful, skillful and trustworthy persons in the profession."
76
B. STANDARD OF CARE
The animal's guardian must affirmatively prove the applicable,
recognized standard of care exercised by other veterinarians, as well as the
defendant veterinarian's divergence from that standard while treating the
animal.77 The requirement of proving such a standard applies where the
veterinarian is a generalist as well as where she is a specialist. 78 Initially,
veterinarians were held only to that degree of skill and learning possessed
by veterinarians in the locality in which the veterinarian practiced.79
However, the trend has been to replace the local standard with a national
standard.80 Expert testimony is almost always necessary to establish the
appropriate standard of care.
81
C. DEVIATION FROM THE STANDARD OF CARE
Most courts have held that expert testimony is also required in order to
establish that the defendant veterinarian deviated from the appropriate
standard of care.82 Though the trend in malpractice cases generally is
toward a greater flexibility in determining the competency of expert
witnesses, the courts are divided as to whether people who routinely care
for animals, such as breeders, ranchers, and zoo workers, should be allowed
83to offer expert testimony evaluating the performance of a veterinarian.
An important exception to the expert testimony requirement applies in
situations where negligence can be determined by common knowledge
74. Price, 680 A.2d at 1152.
75. SOAVE, supra note 8, at 15.
76. Id.
77. Bailey, supra note 6.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Zimmerman v. Robertson, 854 P.2d 338 (Mont. 1993); Durocher v.
Rochester Equine Clinic, 629 A.2d 827 (N.H. 1993).
83. King, supra note 9, at 43-44.
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normally possessed by an average person.8 4 In those cases, the court may
allow lay testimony regarding the non-technical or mechanical acts of
veterinarians, especially where the witness has demonstrated practical
knowledge based on experience.85
Courts may also apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to veterinary
malpractice actions. For example, where a horse being treated by a
veterinarian for a stomach disorder lost his tail to gangrene after an
assistant wrapped the tail too tightly,86 the court found that res ipsa loquitor
applied because, absent negligence, a horse being treated for a stomach
disorder would not ordinarily lose his tail.
87
Despite the similarities between veterinary and medical practices, there
are some substantial differences that have an impact on professional
liability.88 Diagnosis and treatment in veterinary practice may be more
difficult due to the multiple species that veterinarians may be called on to
treat. For instance, certain diseases may affect different species in
considerably different ways. 89 Most significantly, animals cannot verbally
communicate their symptoms as human patients often can. Consequently,
veterinarians often have much less information available to them as they
attempt to diagnose and treat their patients.
The amount of control a veterinarian exercises over the nature of the
treatment is also less than in human medicine. 90 An animal's guardian is
entitled to decline treatment, select a less effective treatment regimen, or
even have the animal euthanized. As a result, the demands of the animal's
guardian may modify the otherwise applicable standard of care and could
thus affect the determination of whether the veterinarian departed from that
standard.
D. PROXIMATE CAUSE
The proximate cause element is probably the biggest barrier to the
plaintiffs' success in these cases. For the plaintiff to prevail, she must
prove that the negligence of the veterinarian was either a direct cause of the
injury or death of an animal, or so closely related that "it could not have
occurred without the negligent act or omission." 91 Although animals are
considered personal property, where the alleged damage to the animal is a
physical disability, a causal connection between that injury and the physical
84. Bailey, supra note 6.
85. See Staples v. Steed, 52 So. 646 (Ala. 1910).
86. Carter v. Louisiana State University, 520 So.2d 383, 385 (La. 1988).
87. Id. at 388.
88. King, supra note 9, at 7.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 8.
91. SOAVE, supra note 8, at 28.
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disability must be established in much the same way as where the injury is
to a human.
92
Except with regard to questions of cause and effect that are so evident
as to be matters of common knowledge, the causal connection between an
injury and a subsequent physical disability involves a scientific inquiry and
must usually be established by expert medical opinion.93 This means that a
veterinarian must be willing and able to testify that, "to a reasonable
medical certainty," the injury to the animal at issue would not have
occurred absent the negligence of the defendant veterinarian. Put another
way, an expert must be willing to testify that it is more likely than not (a
preponderance of the evidence standard) that the injury was caused by the
defendant veterinarian's conduct. This normally requires a thorough
review of the circumstances leading to the companion animal's visit to the
veterinarian, as well as the medical records, including pertinent laboratory
results.
E. DAMAGES
Finally, the plaintiff must prove that the injury or harm to their
companion animal resulted in damages to the plaintiff.94 This seemingly
odd requirement stems from the fact that the companion animal lacks
standing to bring a claim and is therefore not a party to the lawsuit. 95
Consequently, the animal's guardian must show that she suffered a loss -
either monetary or emotional.96
IV. RECORDKEEPING AND PROXIMATE CAUSE
One of the reasons proximate cause is especially difficult to prove in
the context of veterinary malpractice is that, in general, veterinary medical
records contain far less information than a plaintiff needs in order to
establish causation. While some states have specific laws and regulations
that require maintenance of medical records, many do not.97 The veterinary
boards of each state suggest minimum standards for veterinary medical
records. How veterinarians maintain their medical records in practice,
however, can vary markedly from those standards. 98 In a survey of
veterinary specialists, it was reported that the medical records of those
cases referred by other veterinarians were "clear and complete" only 47
percent of the time, and that "all communication with the client" was
92. Bailey, supra note 6.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. JAMES F. WILSON, LAW AND ETHICS OF THE VETERINARY PROFESSION 321 (1988).
98. H. Dennis McCurdy, The Paperless Practice, 218 J. AM. VETERINARY MED.
Ass'N 1776 (June 1, 2001).
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documented only 12 pecent of the time. 99 H. Dennis McCurdy, a doctor of
veterinary medicine, concedes that while medical records should be the
backbone of veterinary practice, minimal attention is paid to veterinary
medical records, and the volume of data recorded in a private veterinary
office is significantly less than that recorded by university veterinary
clinics or human hospitals. 100
Why are veterinarians not keeping better medical records? One
possibility is that although professors of veterinary medicine often tell their
students about the importance of what is in a particular animal's medical
record, there is little talk about identifying the critical information to collect
once the students have gone into their own private practice. 10 1 While
veterinarians just starting out in their practice may be unsure of what
information should be recorded in medical records, those veterinarians who
have experience may offer little guidance since they themselves may not
have been taught about good recordkeeping. A related explanation is that
veterinarians lack incentives to keep good medical records. Many states do
not require that medical records be kept, and among those states that have
recordkeeping standards, "it is not generally agreed what information must
be recorded in patient medical records.' 0 2 In addition, there is often no
regulation regarding record retention.
0 3
Bruce Wagman, a highly-regarded attorney in the emerging field of
animal law, has extensive knowledge of recordkeeping practices in both
human medical records (he is a former nurse) and veterinary medical
records. He believes that comprehensive medical records are essential to
proving causation. Wagman regularly receives requests to represent
plaintiffs in veterinary malpractice cases, but he discourages many
potential clients from pursuing their claims because of the difficulty of
carrying the burden of proof with respect to causation. Wagman asserts
that veterinary records are generally of lower quality and are much less
comprehensive than human medical records. 14 He is troubled by the great
difficulty of proving causation in most veterinary malpractice cases due to
deficient veterinary medical records.' 
05
The tough task of determining the cause of an injury is complicated
further by the fact that, unlike most humans, animals cannot report what
happened to them, or even what their symptoms are. For this reason,
99. State of the Industry Report: How Much Do Your Colleagues Refer?,
VETERINARY EcoN., Aug. 2003, at 19 (citing survey of veterinary specialists).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. WILSON, supra note 97, at 318.
103. Id. at 346.
104. Telephone Interview with Bruce Wagman, Morgenstein & Jubelirer LLP,
Adjunct Professor, UC Hastings College of the Law (Feb. 5, 2004) (transcript on file with
the Hastings Women's Law Journal).
105. Id.
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veterinary medical records may be even more crucial than human medical
records.
Because nearly all veterinary procedures are performed in areas where
the animal's guardian is not allowed, the guardian is likely to have only
medical records and the recollection of the veterinarians and their staff on
which to rely in order to prove malpractice. If the records themselves are
incomplete or have not been retained for a reasonable period of time, the
plaintiff would have to rely exclusively on the recollection of the
veterinarians and their staff. Recollections often prove faulty, perhaps
especially where there is 'an inherent conflict of interest. While expert
witnesses could be brought in to testify as to what they thought might have
occurred, it would be little more than speculation, which will not satisfy the
plaintiffs burden of proof. Under such circumstances, it is difficult for a
plaintiff to meet the high causation standard in veterinary malpractice
cases.
Although statistics are not available for the number of companion
animal deaths caused by veterinary error, according to a study conducted
by the Institute of Medicine, 98,000 humans die each year due to medical
error. 10 6 Hospitals recognize that the absence of a legible medical chart is
one type of error that can put the patient's life in danger. Many hospitals
are investing in technology in an effort to improve the accuracy of medical
records.'0 7 There is no reason the new recordkeeping technology should
not extend to veterinary care, especially since veterinarians are holding
themselves out as professionals subject to malpractice standards.
Veterinarians might argue that the technology is too expensive for their
practice and that the cost of the technology would force them to raise
prices, resulting in fewer animals receiving veterinary care. The facts
refute this argument. Today, there continues to be solid growth in the 30
billion dollar United States companion animal products market - demand
for such luxury items as air-conditioned doghouses and rhinestone ferret
collars has been on the rise. 10 8 Companion animals are valued more than
ever before in most households, and surveys suggest that many guardians
are willing to pay for the best veterinary care available. 109
Clearly, defendant veterinarians have an unfair advantage in the
malpractice arena. They have the advantage of the malpractice standard,
the advantage of lower recordkeeping standards, and are not threatened by
106. Claudia Rosenbaum, Prescribing Penmanship, L.A. TIMEs, June 4, 2001, at El.
107. Id.
108. Reuters, Dog Translation Device Coming to the US., CNN, Mar. 24, 2003, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/biztech/03/24/tech.dogs.language.reut.
109. Rebecca Huss, Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J., 479,
484 n.17, Jerry Gleeson, Dog-gone Expensive, J. NEWS (WESTCHESTER Co., N.Y.), Dec. 26,
2001, at 1 D (reporting on a survey by the American Animal Hospital Association that found
more than one third of respondents would be willing to pay almost any amount of money to
save the lives of their pets).
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the replacement value remedy. With all these benefits before the courts,
they should be required to bear the responsibility of adequate
recordkeeping.
V. BURDEN-SHIFTING AS A SOLUTION TO EVEN THE
PLAYING FIELD
In those instances where a veterinarian has failed to keep adequate
medical records, courts should consider adopting a burden-shifting
approach to the causation element in veterinary malpractice. Burden-
shifting, a familiar tort doctrine, is appropriate in the veterinary malpractice
context because of the unique difficulty of proving causation where the
defendants are in control of all instrumentalities and means for discovering
the cause of death or injury, and where unlike traditional medical
malpractice, recordkeeping is often lax.
An exploration of the principles and policies underlying burden-
shifting may help to illustrate its appropriateness in the veterinary
malpractice context. In Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, the plaintiffs husband
and son drowned in the hotel swimming pool. l° It was established at trial
that the defendant hotel had failed to provide a lifeguard or any of the
major safety measures the law requires for pools available for public use.'
The defendant argued that the plaintiff bore the burden to establish that the
lack of safety measures was a proximate cause of the drowning. The
California Supreme Court disagreed, holding that under the circumstances,
"the burden of proof on the issue of causation should be shifted to
defendants to absolve themselves if they can."'112 The burden of proof was
shifted because the defendants' negligence "deprived the present plaintiffs
of a means of definitively establishing the facts leading to the
drownings."1 3 Put another way, "when the defendant's negligence makes
it impossible, as a practical matter, for plaintiff to 'prove proximate
causation' conclusively, it is more appropriate to hold defendant liable than
to deny an innocent plaintiff recovery."
'
"
14
The Haft court approved of the reasoning in the famous medical
malpractice case, Ybarra v. Spangard, where the court established the res
ipsa loquitor theory of recovery in malpractice cases. 115 There, the
plaintiff was injured while he was unconscious and undergoing surgery. 1 6
The court placed the burden of proof on the operating room personnel to
110. 478 P.2d 465, 466 (Cal. 1970).
111. Id. at 468.
112. Id. at 475.
113. Id.
114. Id. at476n.19.
115. Id. at 475.
116. Haft, 478 P.2d at 475.
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prove they did not cause the injury.' 17
The Haft court also recognized that "the judiciary has responded to the
uncertainties of proof inherent in a variety of parallel situations by shifting
the burden of proof to a clearly negligent party."" 8
In parallel terms, the shift of the burden of proof in the instant case
may be said to rest on a policy judgment that when there is a
substantial probability that a defendant's negligence was a cause of
an accident, and when the defendant's negligence makes it
impossible, as a practical matter, for plaintiff to prove "proximate
causation" conclusively, it is more appropriate to hold the
defendant liable than to deny an innocent plaintiff recovery, unless
the defendant can prove that his negligence was not a cause of the
injury.19
The burden-shifting approach found in Haft has also been used in
professional negligence cases such as Galanek v. Wismar. There the
plaintiff hired Wismar to bring suit against Honda Motor Company in a
products liability action.120  The plaintiff alleged that her vehicle was
defective and she sought damages for injuries she sustained in an
automobile accident. 12' Honda obtained summary judgment on the case,
because Wismar had failed to preserve the plaintiffs vehicle after the
accident.122 The plaintiff then sued Wismar for legal malpractice.123 In the
malpractice action, the trial court granted a nonsuit on the grounds that
without the vehicle at issue, the plaintiff could not meet her burden of
establishing that Wismar's negligence caused her to lose her case against
Honda. 124 The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the burden should
have been shifted to the defendant. 125 The court noted that:
[t]o require Galanek to establish causation in the instant matter
would permit Wismar to take advantage of the lack of proof
resulting from his own negligence. Wismar cannot be insulated
from personal liability by the very act of professional negligence
that subjects him to liability. A fundamental principle of our legal
system is 'no one can take advantage of his own wrong.
' 26
117. Id.
118. Id. at 476.
119. Id. at476 n.19.
120. 81 Cal Rptr.2d 236, 238 (1999).
121. id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Wismar, 81 Cal Rptr.2d 236.at 243, citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3517 (West 1999).
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Burden-shifting has been applied in the medical malpractice context as
well - in a situation directly applicable to the recordkeeping concerns
addressed supra. In a medical malpractice action against a hospital, the
plaintiffs ability to proceed was hindered because the hospital could not
produce the records of her medical procedure. 127 Without those records,
the plaintiffs expert witness was unable to give an opinion as to the
hospital's negligence. 128 The Florida Supreme Court held that the use of a
rebuttable presumption shifting the burden of proof to the defendant was
appropriate. 129 The Valcin doctrine, as it has come to be known, is applied
when, due to defendant's negligence, essential records are missing or
inadequate and that absence or inadequacy hinders the plaintiffs ability to
establish a prima facie case. 130 Once the defendant introduces evidence
tending to disprove the presumed fact, the trier-of-fact decides whether that
.evidence is sufficient to meet the burden of proving that the presumed fact
did not exist.
31
In Sweet v. Sisters of Providence, the Supreme Court of Alaska
followed the reasoning in Valcin. There, the plaintiffs alleged a hospital's
negligence caused their son Jacob's injury, and that the hospital's inability
to find certain medical records made it impossible for them to prove
medical negligence. 32 The plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to a
conclusive presumption of negligence. 33  Rather than allowing a
conclusive presumption of negligence, the trial court shifted the burden of
proof to the hospital on the issues of its duty and alleged breach of that duty
in providing medical care to the baby.' 34 However, the trial court did not
shift the burden of proof as to causation.1 35 On appeal, the Sweets argued
that the hospital should bear the burden of proving that Jacob's injuries
were not caused by the hospital's negligence. 36 The Supreme Court of
Alaska agreed:
Just as the missing records may have impaired the Sweets' ability
to prove medical negligence, they would in the same way impair
the Sweets' ability to prove a causal connection between any
negligence and Jacob's injuries. It is for this very reason that a
number of courts in other jurisdictions have created a rebuttable
presumption shifting the burden of persuasion to a heath care
127. Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Valcin, 507 So.2d 596, 597 (Fla. 1987).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 599.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 600.
132. 895 P.2d 484, 486 (Alaska 1995).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 490.
135. Id. at 491.
136. Id. at 490-91.
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provider who negligently alters or loses medical records relevant to
a malpractice claim.1
37
The court held that once the plaintiff had established that the absence of the
medical records hindered his ability to establish a prima facie case, and
absent a jury finding that the hospital's failure to maintain Jacob's records
was excused, the trial court should have adopted a rebuttable presumption
that the hospital was medically negligent in treating Jacob and that this
negligence legally caused Jacob's injuries.138 The court went on to say that
"[t]his interpretation appears to best implement public policy that adequate
operative notes be kept."'
139
Similarly, public policy would be' best served if adequate veterinary
records were kept. Shifting the burden of proof on the issue of causation in
veterinary malpractice cases would provide the same types of incentives to
veterinarians as those the courts have found appropriate for medical
doctors. Currently, veterinarians can take advantage of their own negligent
recordkeeping. By switching the burden of proof with respect to causation,
courts can begin to provide a genuine opportunity for a remedy in a
veterinary malpractice cause of action. This will also provide a motivation
for veterinarians to maintain adequate and complete medical records, which
will benefit not mainly plaintiffs in lawsuits, but the animals themselves.
Certainly, this is a salutary benefit veterinarians should be happy to obtain.
To clarify, negligence in failing to maintain medical records does not
necessarily relate to whether the medical procedure involved was
conducted negligently, but it precludes the plaintiffs ability to prove any
negligence occurred in the first place. The burden should be shifted only to
level the parties' positions with respect to proving causation and to allow
the plaintiff to proceed. The presumption is limited in its application. In
order for a court to shift the burden, the plaintiff must first convince the
court that the absence or inadequacy of the medical records hinders her
ability to establish a prima facie case. 140 Even if the plaintiff carries this
initial burden, the resulting presumption that the animal's injury or death
was caused by the veterinarian's negligence is rebuttable.
The Valcin doctrine, like other burden-shifting doctrines, is based on
fairness. There is significant unfairness in the application of veterinary
malpractice today when veterinarians are allowed to avoid liability by
failing to keep adequate medical records. The veterinarian's exclusive
137. Sweet, 895 P.2d at 491.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Anesthesiology Critical Care & Pain Mgmt. Consultants, P.A. v.
Kretzer, 802 So.2d 346, 349 (Ct. App. Fla. 2001) (denying plaintiffs request for a Valcin
presumption because plaintiff had failed to show that alleged missing records hindered her
ability to establish a prima facie case).
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knowledge of the medical procedures involved, and the lack of direct
evidence of causation in the absence of complete medical records, should
compel a shifting of the burden of proof in veterinary malpractice.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although there are various property-based causes of action that could
apply in instances where a companion animal is injured or dies while under
veterinary care, there seems to be a trend toward applying the medical
malpractice framework. If veterinarians are to have the advantage of
professional negligence standards, they should likewise bear the burden of
keeping adequate medical records. If the records are not adequate, and as a
result plaintiffs are hindered in their ability to prove causation, the Valcin
doctrine should be applied.
Courts have applied a burden-shifting approach for reasons relating to a
lack of information available to the plaintiff, often due to inadequate
recordkeeping. As H. Dennis McCurdy, doctor of veterinary medicine,
cautioned, "[w]ork on quality [veterinary] medical records is in progress,
but until the value is clear, support for this effort will remain limited."'
141
One way to increase the support of the efforts toward improving the quality
of medical records is to put veterinarians in a position of having to prove
that their actions or omissions were not the proximate cause of an injury the
animal sustained while in their care. Still, protection against lawsuits is not
the primary reason for keeping accurate and detailed records - providing
animals with good veterinary care is, and a system of improved
recordkeeping would go a long way toward ensuring better care for all
companion animals.
141. McCurdy, supra note 98, at 1777.
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